《TELOS》 郑琪

内容提要：brings these reflections on the representational character of the political to the issue of a universal human ethic when she considers Schmitt’s approach to international tribunes of law. On the one hand, Schmitt argues that because the sovereign state defines the enemy as someone who threatens the way of life that the state must protect, the individual must be willing to fight and die for the state. On the other hand, in order to deny that individuals could be prosecuted by international law for collaborating with an unjust state in war, Schmitt insists in 1945 that the individual must obey the state so long as the state protects the individual but that individuals would have the right to refuse to fight for the state if the state cannot protect them. Consequently, an international law that offers no protection to individual resisters against a state cannot have a claim against individuals who fail to resist. Zheng argues that this latter argument is in fact anomalous for Schmitt because he generally subordinates individual rights to the collective. His insistence on the protection of the individual in 1945 could be either a tactical shift that he makes in order to oppose the idea that international law might be used to prosecute former Nazis or part of a more strategic opposition to the idea of a world state. In either case, the way toward an international ethic and corresponding law would consist for Schmitt of the development of a species-wide sense in which individuals would feel themselves to be part of a collective, requiring new mythic forms of representation.